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similar items, and might cause South Africa to change permanently to
some other supplier for all defence equipment; there might be reper-
cussions in the field of South African civil Government procurement
which amounted to £30 million a year; and the view had been strongly expressed that our general trading relations with South Africa would
be seriously affected. Moreover, we should weaken such influence
as we possessed with the South African Government; while the recent
South African action in sending police into Rhodesia to take part in
combating incursion by terrorists was evidence that our influence in
South Africa was limited, nonetheless this aspect could not be ignored,
particularly in view of the somewhat greater flexibility of policy
displayed by Dr. Vorster since he had become Prime Minister of South
Africa.
While a decision either way would have embarrassing consequences,
on balance the better course was to agree to supply the equipment (other than the Centurian tank spares).
The South African enquiry had
and he had postponed bringing
been made at the beginning of the year; it before his colleagues partly because the time for taking and (as we should have to do) announcing a decision had not been propitious.
So far, the South Africans had accepted the delay, but any further
postponement would be likely to be taken by them as an indication of our intention to refuse to supply the equipment.
THE DEFENCE SECRETARY said that the naval support facilities which
we enjoyed under the Simonstown Agreement, and which we should jeopardise
by an unfavourable reply to South Africa, were essential at any time
when, as at present, the Suez Canal was closed; thirty naval vessels
had made use of them since the closure of the Canal in May. Our present plans were based on the assumption that we should maintain a naval presence in the Far East for the foreseeable future and
recent events demonstrated that we could not rely on the Suez Canal.
That apart, the loss of the overflying and staging facilities which
we enjoyed in South Africa would impair our military flexibility.
But the decisive considerations in favour of supplying the equipment
were not military but political and economic.
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